Using the Political Process Instead
of the Courts
By M. Robert Goldstein and Michael J. Goldstein
Often, when a property is the subject of
a proposed condemnation, the owner asks two questions: "What
is this, Nazi Germany?" and, "How can we stop this?"
The first question is relatively easy to
answer. Of course we are not Nazi German. A country need not
embrace dictatorial philosophies to acquire property by eminent
domain. Historically, eminent domain was and is the inherent
right of all governments; the United States did not invent
it. It did, however, limit it. It did so by including, at
the end of the Fifth Amendment, the phrase, " . . . nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation."
In truth, eminent domain was not an important
concern of our forefathers. The function of government was
so much more limited in the early part of our history that
not much land was required for public use, and nobody seemed
to care much, since it did not come up often. It was not debated
at the Constitutional Convention and was not included in the
body of the original document but was added as an afterthought,
at the end of the Fifth Amendment. When it was added, the
evil to be corrected was not takings for public use but lack
of compensation. The operative phrase was "without just
compensation," not "for public use," which
leads us to the answer to the second question.
The Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL) is
the comprehensive law that uniformly dictates the procedures
that must be followed by the state, municipalities and other
entities with the power of eminent domain. With certain exceptions,
not relevant here, public hearings must be held before the
condemnation may take place. Following those hearings, the
condemnor must make a determination and findings and publish
a "brief synopsis."
The determination and findings must include
the "public use, benefit or purpose" of the proposed
project, the approximate location and the reasons for selecting
the location and the general effect on the environment and
residents and whatever else they consider relevant (EDPL §204).
The Judicial Challenge
The section that deals with the judicial
challenge to the proposed condemnation is EDPL §207,
and that leaves a very small window of opportunity. Within
30 days after the completion of the publication of the determination
and findings, as required by EDPL §204, those persons
who are "aggrieved," may seek judicial review. The
definition of persons "aggrieved" could probably
be the subject of a column by itself.
These persons must file a petition in the
Appellate Division in the judicial department where the proposed
condemnation is to take place. The petition must be accompanied
by proof of service of a demand on the condemnor to file a
written copy of the transcript of the record of the proceeding,
i.e., the public hearing, and a copy of the determination
and findings. Note that the initial hearing is in the Appellate
Division, not the Special Term of the Supreme Court where
the petition for an order of condemnation is to be brought.
If more than one Appellate Division is involved, the petition
may be brought in either one, but only one.
The jurisdiction of the Appellate Division
is exclusive, and its order is final but subject, of course,
to review in the Court of Appeals. The section gives the proceeding
a lawful preference over other matters.
EDPL§207(C) limits the scope of review
in the Appellate Division to whether:
(1) the proceeding was in conformity
with the federal and state constitutions,
(2) the proposed acquisition is within
the condemnor's statutory jurisdiction or authority,
(3) The condemnor's determination
and findings were made in accordance with the procedures
set forth in this article and with article eight of the
environmental conservation law, and
(4) a public use, benefit or purpose
will be served by the proposed acquisition.
It is interesting to note that Par. (4) used
to only require a public use but, in 1982, it was changed
to "public use, benefit or purpose." The Legislature
was unduly cautious, for "public use" had been construed
to mean that long before the enactment of the amendment.
In 1991, 13 years after the original effective
date of EDPL, Par. (3) was amended to include the reference
to Article 8 of the Environmental Conservation Law. This brings
to mind the celebrated proposed Westway condemnations. It
is believed, incorrectly, by many people that this project
was defeated in the courts because it disturbed the breeding
areas of striped bass. It was only delayed in the courts.
The project, which was hotly disputed in the media and City
Council, was killed afterward politically, not in the courts.
A much less controversial improvement to the Westside Highway
is now planned.
Limitations on the Courts
But, all of this begs the question. The procedure
is only part of the answer and is for lawyers, not condemnees.
The client wants to know whether or not using the procedures
provided, the condemnor can be stopped from taking his or
her property. Our answer to the clients who ask this question
is usually, as a practical matter, not in the courts. If it
is going to be stopped at all, it must be stopped in the political
process of studies and public hearings. This is because the
courts are limited in their scope of review by EDPL §207(C),
and it is very difficult, if the condemnor has done its homework,
to defeat the condemnation on those grounds.
Par. (3) is probably the easiest with which
to deal. Assuming the worst, i.e., that the condemnor's
determination and findings were not made in accordance with
the procedures required by EDPL Article 2 and the Environmental
Conservation Law, Article 8, all you can do is delay the process.
If the condemnor is determined to go ahead
with the project, it will go back and follow the procedures
it neglected to follow the first time. All the condemnee will
have done is to delay it and hope to then defeat it politically.
This, however, is not necessarily good from the condemnee's
point of view for , if he or she can not kill it politically,
all that has been done is to have extended the period when
the property is subject to the threat of condemnation. Tenants
may move out and not be replaced. Rents may have to be lowered.
Buyers will not want to buy into a condemnation with its litigation
and delays, and the owner will be reluctant to put any substantial
improvements on the property lest their cost be lost in the
valuation process.
Source of Power
Par. (2) is a little more cut and dry. The
state has the original power of eminent domain, and the municipalities
and various authorities that have it have been specifically
given that power by the state, by legislative enactment. The
power is usually found in the legislation that gave the municipality
or authority the right to exist, and that is often limited
in the purposes for which the municipality or authority is
permitted to condemn.
Therefore, the question of whether the proposed
acquisition is within the condemnor's statutory jurisdiction
or authority is answered by looking to the source of the power.
If the authority is not there, the municipality or authority
may not condemn.
This was the basis of the challenge to the
acquisition by the New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation (DEC) of 1,067 acres of land owned by Benjamin
Wechsler and of his exclusive hunting, fishing and trapping
rights in an 1,800-acre parcel owned by the state, both of
which were part of the Neversink River Gorge. The stated purpose
of the acquisition was to preserve and protect the natural
beauty and unique character of the area, clearly within the
authority of the DEC, and to allow for increased public access,
not within the delegated authority.
The Court of Appeals, in Wechsler v. NYSDEC,
76 NY2D 923 (1990) found that DEC, in seeking to preserve
the area of great natural beauty was within the legislative
grant of authority. They then added, "That the acquisition
may also incidentally serve other identified goals, such as
increasing the public's access to, and recreational use
of, these lands does not detract from the propriety of the
agency's proposed use of 'unique' area project
funds to advance the primary goal of preservation."
The incidental use concept was not new, but
we fail to understand how the acquisition of Mr. Wechsler's
exclusive hunting, fishing and trapping rights on land already
owned and preserved by the state only incidentally serve the
goal of increasing public access and recreational use, not
otherwise within DEC's authority.
Court's Reluctance
We believe this illustrates the courts'
reluctance to defeat an acquisition by condemnation. As has
happened on several occasions, however, Par. (2) has been
circumvented by a simple expediency: Public authorities that
do not have the delegated authority to condemn for a certain
purpose enlist the aid of other authorities with the authority
to do it for them.
Pars. (1) and (4), we believe, are redundant.
As we noted above, Par. (4) originally required that a public
use will be served. In 1982, they added a public "benefit
or purpose" also need to be served. An examination of
the cases over the past 100 years or so indicates very clearly
that a "public use," as required by the Fifth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, §7(a) of the
New York State Constitution has been interpreted to include
a public benefit or purpose. To serve these purposes in Par.
(4) is to also satisfy Par. (1), which requires the taking
to be in conformity with the federal and state constitutions.
The issue raised by Pars. (1) and (4) is
the subject of probably most of the challenges to takings.
A full examination of this subject would be too long for the
balance of this column. It should and will be the subject
of another column on another day. A short overview, however,
is called for and we will attempt that.
As we stated earlier in this column, the
evil sought to be addressed by tagging on the takings clause
to the Fifth Amendment was the nonpayment of just compensation.
Public use was not a concern nor did it become one for about
100 years, because land was plentiful and government had a
more limited role. It not having become an issue, its definition
had yet to be determined. In the past 100 years, the definition
of public use broadened as the role of government increased
and land became less available.
The Railroads
From the outset, no one questioned that a
road, over which the public was to travel, was a public use.
In the latter part of the 19th Century, however,
railroads became more a pat of American life and were a major
factor in the commerce of the country. Railroads, however,
were privately owned, so how could an acquisition for a railroad
right-of-way be for a public use. Clearly, without the power
of eminent domain, the railroads could not be built.
In 1888, the Court of Appeals answered the
question by stating, " . . . railroads are highways furnishing
means of communication between different points, promoting
traffic and commerce, facilitating exchanges, in a word, they
are improved ways . . . The duty of providing public ways
is . . . a public duty." The court did not consider that
the use was carried out by a private corporation to its own
profit changed the nature of the public use. (Matter of
Niagara Falls & Whirlpool Railway Co., 108 N.Y. 375).
Of course, the question of how much of the
public must be served for it to be a public use had to come
up, and it did in Pocantico Water Works Co. v. Bird, 130 N.Y. 249. In that case, the power to condemn was delegated
to a private water company so that it could build a dam and
create reservoirs to provide water to certain specified towns.
The Court of Appeals said in that case,
It is doubtless true that in order to
make the use public, a duty must develop upon the persons
or corporations holding the property to furnish the public
with the use intended. The term implies the "use
of many" or "by the public" but it may
be limited to the inhabitants of a small restricted locality,
but the use must be in common and not for a particular
individual.
The same court declared, as have many other
in similar circumstances, that while the necessity of taking
is to be determined solely by the Legislature the decision
whether the taking is for public use is a judicial one. Some
courts, however, have held that declarations by the Legislature
that the taking is for public use would be persuasive evidence
of that fact.
Public Housing
In 1936, the New York courts expanded the
concept beyond that of a simple use by the public. The New
York Housing Authority sought to condemn a substandard area
for a low income housing project. The stated purpose was the
clearing of the area. This was challenged on the basis that
the public could find nothing to use in the clearing of a
blighted area. Therefore, it could not be a public use.
The Court of Appeals addressed the issue
directly. It said, ". . . use of a proposed structure,
facility or service by everybody and anybody is one of the
abandoned universal tests of a public use . . . the Courts
have vainly attempted to define comprehensively the concept
of a public use . . . to formulate anything ultimate even
though it were possible, would, in an inevitably changing
world, be unwise if not futile . . . The law of each age is
ultimately what the age thinks should be the law." (Matter
of N.Y.C. Hsg. Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333).
This set the tone for what has become an
almost limitless expansion of the term public use. In K
& C Realty, Inc. v. State of New York, 32 NY2d 664,
the Court of Appeals upheld a lower court finding that §10,
Subd. 24-d of the Highway Law is constitutional even though
it provides for condemning the property of one person to give
access to the otherwise landlocked property of another when
the landlocking is caused by the simultaneous acquisition
of the property by a condemnation.
Beyond the clearing of substandard areas,
§72-N of Article 15 of the General Municipal Law authorized
the taking of predominately vacant areas that are economically
dead and impair the community's growth. This was upheld
in Cannata v. City of New York, 11 NY2d 210, App. Dism.
371 U.S.4. There have been decisions allowing the City of
Yonkers to acquire land to give to private industry for expansion
so as to keep jobs from leaving, and the U.S. Supreme Court
allowed the State of Hawaii to break up large plantations
and distribute them to smaller farmers.
How available, then, are Pars. (1) and (4)
for defeating a condemnation. The answer is, not very. We
repeat the advice we have given many clients. If you want
to keep them from taking your property, do it politically,
before it every gets to the courts. Reprinted with permission from the December 27, 1994 edition of the New York Law Journal © 2010 Incisive Media Properties, Inc. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited.
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